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THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE COMMON LAW IS APPLIED IN DE-
TERMINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A CRIME, AND THE NATURE
AND DEGREE OF PUNISHMENT CONSEQUENT THEREUPON.
PART I.
OF THE ORIGIN EARLY HISTORY, AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
THE COMMON LAW.
1, 2, 3. Conflict among leading writers as to the origin of the common law.
Hallam's criticism not sustained.
4, 5, 6. Punishment by death existed among the Saxons. Fines were only a
commutation for that punishment.
7. Early collections of laws principally of Saxon origin.
8. Early English legislation but declaratory or in affirmance of the common law.
9. Those acts of legislation opposed to it productive of evil.
10. Early influence of the common law in construction of statutes.
11, 12, 13. And in preventing torture, extortion, and grievances.
13, 14, 15. Different appellations of the common law. Those in force in America.
16, 17, 18. 'What the common law is and where to be sought for. Its elasticity.
19, 20, 21. Various nations and other systems of laws have lent it their aid.
22. Sir Walter Scott's views of its peculiar advantages.
23, 24, 25. Its relative comprehensiveness in England and America.
26. Its superiority to other systems of law.
27. Definition and description showing the vast scope of its influence.
28, 29. Another illustration of its principles.
30, 31. Eulogium on it by one of its warm defenders in this country.
1. THERE is much conflict, by writers on the question, in refer-
ence to the origin of the common law. Hallam, for instance,
says, that the English lawyers, prone to magnify the antiquity
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like the other merits of their system, are apt to carry up the date
of the common law, till, like the pedigree of an illustrious family,
it loses itself in the obscurity of ancient time: Hallam's Middle
Ages, vol. 1, p. 120. By his own showing, though, it seems that.
the comparison which he has himself instituted is peculiarly
appropriate, and that the origin of the common law, very much
like the pedigree of some " illustrious families," is lost in the
obscurity of antiquity. His own admissions are, that some of the
features of the common law may be distinguished in Saxon times,
and that our limited knowledge prevents us from assigning many
of its peculiarities to any determinate period.
2. Hume considers that the body of laws framed by Alfred, as
a guide to the magistrates in the administration of justice, though
now lost, served long as the basis of English jurisprudence, and
he adds that " this body of laws is generally deemed the origin
of what is denominated the common law :" Hume's Hist. of Eng.,
vol. 1, p. 105. And Hallam admits-notwithstanding he places
the origin of the common law at a much later period-that the
treatise denominated the laws of Henry I. (and which are merely
a compilation) bears much of a Saxon character.
8. Neither Sir Edward Coke, Sir Matthew Hale, nor any of
the other old common-law writers, contend that the common law
was not very greatly changed after the accession of the Norman
dynasty to the English throne. See 4 Bla. Com., ch. 88. It is
of the origin of the common law that. Sir Matthew Hale says-
" It is as undiscoverable as that of the Nile." And, although
the talented historian of the middle ages may be right in con-
sidering the establishment of a legal system as not being complete
until about the end of Henry III.'s reign, when the unwritten
usages of the common law, as well as the forms and precedents
of the courts, were digested into the great work of Bracton, yet,
this in nowise militates against the idea of the old writers, that
the origin of those unwritten usages, and of those forms and pre-
cedents, is lost in the oblivion of much earlier periods.
4. The pecuniary compensation for crimes-referred to and
dwelt strongly on by Hallam-which existed in the Saxon periods,
was not, it is true, known in after ages, but, even in the time of
Alfred,' there existed a law for the punishment .of wilful murder
"The good King Alfred's zeal against murder first caused it to be capitally
punished:" Consd. on Or. Law (A. D. 1772), p. 353.
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by death (1 Hume's Hist., p. 223), and this seems to have con-
tinued in force until the time of William the Conqueror, who took
away all capital punishment, substituting therefor various kinds
of mutilations: Reeves's Hist. of Eng. Law, vol. 1, p. 193.
5. Mr. Reeves, in his History of English Law, in treating upon
the early criminal law of England, says-" All injuries inflicted
to person or property, were, under the early criminal law of the
Anglo-Saxons, commuted by a payment of money; the idea of a
compensation for a money-recompense going so far as to extend
even to the taking of the life of a man ; and radiating upward and
downward on a scale proportioned to the greater or less value and
elevation of the life and dignity of the person killed." These
fines, in cases of homicide and in thefts of various kinds, were in
lieu of the punishment of death, which also was redeemable by a
great variety of inflictions of other corporal punishments. For
the commission of certain infamous offences, there was also pun-
ishment, or trial, by ordeal, of persons who had previously been
under accusations for violations of the law: Ibid., pp. 14, 15.
6. In the reign of Henry I., murder was again made a capital
offence, as it had been prior to the change in that respect made
by William the Conqueror. Glanville, who wrote about A. D. 1181,
says-" If, on the trial by ordeal, a person is convicted of a capital
offence, then the judgment is of life and members, which are at
the king's mercy, as in other pleas concerning felony:" Glan-
ville, b. 14, ch. 1, p. 347.1
7. One of the earliest collections of laws was made by Edward
the Confessor, which comprised the whole law of the kingdom,
containing not only the unwritten customs, but the laws and cus-
toms made by the several kings. This volume was lost, and thus
much relating to the early Anglo-Saxon customs, or common law,
perished. From the remains of Saxon legislation, it is inferred,
that the lost volume, like the Saxon laws that are in existence,
was principally taken up with an enumeration of crimes and their
punishment: 1 Reeves's Hist. 26. The laws adopted by William
the Conqueror, says Sir Matthew Hale, consisted principally of
those of Edward the Confessor: Hist. of Com. Law, p. 5.
8. Most of the early statutes which have come down to us were
I By the laws of King Athelstan, a thief who was upwards of twelve years old,
and stole more than the value of twelve pence, was punished with death: Consdu.
on Cr. Law, p. 399.
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passed in affirmince of the common law, or declaratory of it.
Thus, the statute declaring that a servant killing his master; a
wife killing her husband; an ecclesiastical person killing his
prelate or superior, to whom he owed faith or obedience, was-
guilty of petit treason; was, says Lord Coke, but declaratory of
the common law as it had previously existed: 3d Inst. 20. The
statute 25 Edw. 3 is also, for the most part, declaratory of the
common law, and therefore the word declaration (dedarisement)
is used in it. And where the violation of the queen regnant is
made treason, the Mirror (cap. 1, § 5) and Britton (c. 23, fo. 43)
show that the common law is to the same effect. So, also, as to
the violation of the king's eldest daughter unmarried; levying
war within the realm without the king's authority; and other
offences against the Statute of Treasons, are sliown by Bracton,
The Mirror, Britton, Fleta, and Glanville, to have been treason
at common law. And Coke says (3d Inst. 16), for counterfeiting,
the punishment was only as in petit treason, because the statute
is but a declaration of the common law, and for counterfeiting
the punishment at common law was only as for petit treason:
Fleta, 1. 1, c. 22. So tie clause providing for the forfeiture of
the escheats to the king is in affirmance of the common law:
JohnD e Brittain's Case, 20 Ed. 1, n. 2. The statute of 1 Edw.
6 is a plain declaration and resolution of the common law, as is
also the statute of 1 Edw. 3: 3 Inst. 65. On this point, Hale,
in his History, of the Common Law, p. 49, says-" Now, as to
matters criminal, whether capital or not, they are determinable
by the common law, and not otherwise; and in affirmance of that
law are the statutes of Magna Charta, cap. 29; 5 Edw. 3, c. 9;
25 Edw. 3, c. 4 ; 29 Edw. 3, c. 3 ; 27 Edw. 3, c. 17 ; 38 Edw. 3,
c. 9, and 40 Edw. 3, c. 3; the effect of which is that no man
shall be put out of his lands or tenements, or be imprisoned upon
a-iy suggestion, unless it be by indictment or presentment of law-
ful men, or by process at common law." And by the statute of
1 Hen. 4, in affirmance of this, it is enacted (cap.- 14) that no
appeals be sued in Parliament at'any time to come. This extends
to all accusations by particular persons, and that not only of
treason or felony, but of other crimes and misdemeanors. Many
of the statutes of Hen. 3, and Edw. 1 and 2, were made but in
affirmance of the common law, and the rest of them are so anciet,
that they are, as it were, incorporated, with the judicial resolu-
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tions, decision: and expositions connected with them, into the
common law, and become a part of it: Hale's Com. Law 9. And
Mr. Reeves says-", These statutes which were made before the
time of memory, and have not since been repealed, nor altered by.
contrary usage, or subsequent Acts of Parliament, are considered
as a part of the leges non scriptce, being, as it were, incorporated
into and become a part of our common law :" 1 Reeves's -ist.
of Eng. Law 215. And, notwithstanding copies of these may be
found, their provisions obtain at this day, not as Acts of Parlia-
ment, but by immemorial usage and custom, of which kind is, no
doubt, a great part of our common law: Hale's Com. Law 3.
c nd, doubtless," adds Lord Hale, "many of those things that
now obtain as common law, had their original by Act of Parlia-
ment, or constitutions, made in writing by the king, lords, and
commons." For in many of the acts that are yet extant, numbers
of those laws are to be found enacted, which now obtain merely
as common law, or the general custom of the realm: Ibid.
Blackstone says, that it is agreed by all our historians that the
great charter of King John was, for the most part, compiled from
the ancient customs of the realm, or the laws of King Edward
the Confessor; by which they usually mean the old common law,
which was established under our Saxon princes, before the rigors
of feudal tenure and other hardships were imported from the
continent by the kings of the Norman line: Blk. Law Tracts,
pref. 12.
9. By statute 1 & 2 Ph. & Ma. it was enacted, that" all trials
hereafter to be had, awarded, or made for any treason, shall be
had and used only according to the due order and course of te
comron law." By the statute of 33 H. 8, c. 23, the right of
peremptory challenge was taken away in cases of high treason.
It was resolved in Sir Walter Baleigh's Case, cited Co. 3 Inst.
27 n, by all the judges, that the statute of I & 2 Mary abrogated
the statute of 33 H. 8, for the end of challenge is to have an
indifferent trial, and all Acts of Parliament made before the Act
of 1 & 2 Ph. & Ma., for trial of high treason, petit treason, or
misprision of treason, contrary to the due course of the common
law, are abrogated by this act, and trials by the due course of the
common law, with challenges incident in those cases, are restored:
Ibid., p. 27. The statute of 33 H. 8, c. 23, was thus decided to
be in derogation of the common law. It was provided by this
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same act, that if a man, attainted of treason, became mad, not-
withstanding this, he should be executed; "which cruel and
inhuman law" (says Coke) "lived not long, but was repealed,
for in that point, also, it was against the common law, because,
by intendment of law, the execution of the offender is for example ;
but so it is not when a madman is executed, but should be a
miserable spectacle, both against law, and of extreme inhuimanity
and cruelty, and can be no example to others :" Ibid., p. 6.
10. Again, the statutes of 1 Edw. 6 and 5 Edw. 6 provide,
that, for treason, petit treason, &c., &c., there shall be two suffi-
cient and lawful witnesses, &c.; the latter statute using the words
"two lawful accusers," in reference to which it was adjudged in
Lord Lumley's Case, Dyer's R., 1 Hil. 14 El., that, as there
were no other " accusers" known to the common law, but lawful
accusers -or witnesses, they must be such as the common law
requires, namely, lawful witnesses. And, by the ancient common
law, one accuser or witness was not sufficient to convict any per-
son of high treason, for, in that case, ", it shall be tried before the
constable and marshal by combat, as by many records appeareth.
But the constable and marshal have no jurisdiction to hold plea
of anything which may be determined or discussed by the common
law :" Co. S Inst. 26. That two witnesses were required at com-
mon law appears also by the Mirror, ca. 8, ord. deat., and by
Bracton, 1. 5, fol. 854; and "accusers" and "w witnesss," in the
above acts, were held to be synonymous.
11. Britton says, If felons come in judgment to answer; &c.,
they shall be out of irons, and all manner of bonds, so that their
pain shall not take away any manner of reason, nor them constrain
to answer but at their free will: cap. 5, fo. 14. And, again, he
'says, "and of prisoners we will that none shall be put in irons
but those which shall be taken for felony, or trespass in parks or
vivaries, or which be found in arrearages upon account, and we
defend that otherwise they shall not be punished nor tormented:"
Britton, c. 11, fo. 17. And the Mirror-" It is an abuse that
prisoners be charged with irons, or put to any pain, before they
be attainted:" cap. 5, § 1. And Sir Edward Coke says--"'It
appeareth, that where the law requireth that a prisoner should be
kept in salva and areta custodia, yet that that must be without
pain or torment to the prisoner:" Co. 8 Inst. 85. The Duke of
Exter having brought in the rack or brake, which is allowed in
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many cases b~y the civil law, Sir John Fortescue, Chief Justice
of England, wrote his book in commendation of the laws of Eng-
land, showing that all torments and tortures of parties accused
were directly against the common law of England, and also showed
the inconvenience thereof, by fearful example: Fortescue, ca. 22,
fo. 24. A question, in reference to this matter, having been put
to the judges, they unanimously declared that the rack was
unknown to the laws of England: 4 Bla. Com. 326.
12. "By the common law, to avoid all extortions and grievances
of the subject, no sheriff, coroner, gaoler, or other of the king's
ministers, ought to take any reward for doing of his office, but
only of the king, and this appeareth by our books, and is so
declared and enacted by Act of Parliament of 8 Edw. 1. And a
penalty is added to the prohibition of the common law by that
act. But after that this rule of the common law was altered, and
that the sheriff, coroner, gaoler, and other the king's ministers,
might in some case take of the subject, it is not credible what
extortions and oppressions have thereupon ensued." So dangerous
a thing is it, adds Coke, to shake or alter any of the fundamental
rules of the common law; which, in truth, are the main pillars
and supporters of the fabric of the commonwealth: 2 Co. Inst. 7-3.
13. St. Germain, in his "Doctor and Student," c. 7, fo. 23
(said to have been written in 1518), says-" By the old custom
of the realm, no man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, nor
otherwise destroyed, but he be put to answer by the law of the
land. And this custom is confirmed by Magna Charta', cap. 26."
Coke, in his 2 Inst. c. 29, p. 45, explains the phrase "by the
law of the land," here used, to mean " by the common law, statute
law, or custom of England, which have been declared and inter-
preted by authority of Parliament, by our books, and by pre-
cedents." He also renders it "by due process of the common
law ;" 2 Inst. 50 ; and, thus, "No man (shall) be put to answer
without presentment before justices, or thing of record, or by due
process, or by writ original, according to the old law of the
land:" Ibid.
14. As regards these styles or appellations of the common law,
Sir Matthew Hale furnishes an enumeration of thom, and the
reasons on which they are founded. Of that, above referred to,
from St. Germain and Lord Coke, lie says- l" 'Tis called some-
times by way of eminenue, Lex Terrwp, as in the statute of Magna
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Charta, cap. 29:" Hale's Hist. of- Com. Law 29; adding, that
there the common law is principally intended by those words aut
_per legem terrce, as appears by the exposition thereof in several
subsequent statutes, and particularly in the statute 28 Edw. 3,
c. 3, which is but an exposition and declaration of Magna
Charta.
15. "Sometimes 'tis called Lex Anglice, as in the Statute of
Merton; sometimes it is called Lex et Consuetudo Begni, as in
all commissions of oyer and terminer, and in the statute de quo
warranto, &c., but, most commonly, it is called I The Common
Law,' or The Common Law of England, as in the statute of
Articuli super chartas, cap. 15; in the statute Edw. 5, c. 5, and
in infinite more records and statutes :" Ibid. 53. It was called
by William the Conqueror, in his confirmation of it, Lex Com-
munis and Lex Patrice. It is also called Lex Non Srizpta (the
unwritten law), to distinguish it from the Lex Scripta, or'statute
law: 1 Blk. Com. 63; 1 Steph. Com. 10, 45. This last-named
designation, however, is not to be considered strictly accurate,
for, as has been seen, much of the common law has been repeat-
edly collected and promulgated by royal authority, and the whole
of it is to be found in the various treatises on the common law,
and in the reports of the decisions of the courts from very early
ages down to the present time. The term is also understood in a
wider sense, as distinguishing the great body of law, whether
statutory or otherwise, administered in common-law courts, as
distinguished from the system of equity administered in courts of
chancery. It has various other appellations, but in American
jurisprudence the common law is chiefly used in the t*o last-
named senses: per STORY, J., in Lessee of Levy v. MlcCartee, 6
Peters 102, 110 ; 1 Kent. Com. 471. As equity has no criminal
jurisdiction, the term is only sensible, in connection with the
subject of this treatise, in the sense of being distinguished from
the statute law; although, as will be hereafter more fully seen
(see post, Part III., §§ 1-5), the term, in this sense, has even
less force here than in England, as the common law of this country
consists not only of the common law of England, but of such
English statutes, also passed before the emigration of our ances-
tors, as were in amendment of the common law, and as were
applicable to the circumstances of the country., And even some
English statutes that have been passed since the settlement of
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this country, have been adopted, and are in force, to a greater
or less extent, in different states, as part of the American
common law.
16. The common law, as the Lex Non Scripta, consists, then,
in England, of those laws which are not comprised under the title
of Acts of Parliament, but which are, for the most part, extant in
records of pleas, proceedings, and judgments ; in books of reports
and judicial decisions; in treatises of learned men's arguments
and opinions, preserved from ancient times and still extant in
writing. But the authoritative and original institutions are not
set down in writing in that manner, or with that authority, that
Acts of Parliament are, but they are grown into use, and have
acquired their binding power, and the force of laws, by a long
and immemorial usage, and by the strength of custom and recep-
tion in the kingdom. A part of the common law, in this accepta-
tion, is that by which proceedings and determinations in the
ordinary courts of justice are directed and guided, and by which
the processes, proceedings, judgments, and executions, of the
ordinary courts of justice; the limits, bounds, and extents of
courts, and their jurisdictions,-the several kinds of temporal
offences and punishments at common law, and the manner of the
application of the several kinds of punishments, with other parti-
culars, extending as far as the many exigencies, in the distribu-
tion of ordinary justice, may require. See Hale's Hist. of Com.
Law, p. 23 et seq.
17. Mr. Reeves also defines the common law in this'sense. He
says that the common law is the custom of the realm, on which
courts of justice exercise their judgment, declaring, by their
interpretation, what is, and what is not, that common law. 'Many
of the statutes that have been enacted prior to the MAfagna Cgiarta
of 9 Hen. 3, have been blended with the custom of the realm,
and have gone to make up the English common law, which common
law, or custom of the realm, consists of those rules and maxims
concerning the persons and property of men, that have obtained
by the tacit assent and usage of the people of England ; being of
the same force with acts of the legislature. The consent and
approbation of the people, with respect to the common law, being
signified by their immemorial use and practice of it: 1 Reeves's
Hist. of Eig. Law 1.
18. The nature of the common law is to be accommodated to
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the condition, exigencies, and conveniences of the people, for, or
by whom they are appointed, as those exigencies and conveniences
insensibly grow upon the people. Thus, though it may be said
of the common law of England, that it was otherwise in the time
of Henry II., when Glanville wrote, or in the time of Henry III.,
when Bracton wrote, than it is now administered, yet it is not
possible to assign the time when the change began; nor have we
all the Acts of Parliament, or judicial resolutions, which might
have induced or occasioned such alterations. The true constitu-
ents of the common law are the common usage or custom and
practice of 'the kingdom in matters lying in usage or custom.
The custom is not simply an unwritten one, as has been seen, nor
orally derived down from one age to another, but it is a custom
that is derived down in writing and transmittedfrom age to age,
especially since the beginning -of the reign of Edward I. ; a
monarch, whose wisdom in connection with the English laws, has
aptly caused him to be designated the English Justinian. Se-
condly: The judicial decisions of courts of justice, consonant to
one another in the series and successions of times. And, thirdly:
The authority of Parliament manifested in introducing such laws.
Much of that which is used and taken as common law is -undoubt-
edly deriyed from old Acts of Parliament, the record of which, in
its original state, is not now to be found. These'were acts "be-
fore time of memory," and are taken as part of the common law
and immemorial customs of the kingdom; though, in their first
original, they were Acts of Parliament. The decisions of courts
of justice are rather to be received as authorities or evidence of
what the law is, than laws in themselves, and they have great
weight as precedents in all subsequent cases that arise, based, as
they are, upon the common reason of the thing. See Hale's
Hist. of Com. Law 57-69.
19. As the common law has been the accumulation of various
ages, so different nations, as the Britons, the Romans, the Saxons,
the Danes, and the Normans, have all brought their contributions
to enrich its stores. Not only so, but other systems of jurispru-
dence have furnished their quota to increase the value of 4 the
gathered wisdom of a thousand years."
20. The civil and canon laws, says a writer before quoted (Mr.
Reeves, Hist. of Eng. Law, vol. 2, p. 37), besides exciting an
emulation in the professors of the common law to cultivate their
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own municipal customs, afforded, from their treasures, ample
means of doing it. The use made of those laws was much nobler
than borrowing their language. To enlarge the plan and scope
of the municipal customs ;.to settle them upon principle; to give
consistency, uniformity, and elegance to the whole ;-these were
the objects the lawyers of those days had in view; and, to further
them, they refused not to make a free use of those refined systems.
Many of the maxims of the civil law were transplanted into ours ;
its rules were referred to as part of our own customs; and argu-
ments, grounded upon the principles of that system of jurispru-
dence, were attended to as a sort of authority.
21. The application the professors of the common law made,
whether of the canon or civil law, in treating subjects of discus-
sion in the law of England, is visible from the account given by
Bracton, whose treatise contains much that is taken from those
systems of law. See Coxe's translation of Giitterbock's Bracton,
Phila. 1866.
22. Sir Walter Scott, in his Life of Napoleon, in describing
the advantages to be derived from the existence of such a system
as the common law of England, says--" Each principle of English
law has been the subject of illustration for many ages, by the
most learned and wise judges, acting upon pleadings conducted
by the most acute and ingenious men of each successive age.
This current of legal judgments has been flowing for centuries,
deciding, as they occurred, every question of doubt which could
arise.upon the application of general principles to particular cir-
cumstances; and each individual case, so decided, fills up some
point which was previously disputable; and, becoming a rule for
similar questions, tends, to that extent, to diminish the debateable
ground of doubt and argument, with which the law must be sur-
rounded like an unknown territory, when it is first partially dis-
covered :" Scott's Life of Napoleon, p. 56.
23. But as comprehensive as the common law is in England, it
is much more comprehensive in this country. In ancient times
(1 H. 7, fo. 6) adultery and fornication were punishable by fine
and imprisonment iA the courts of common law. But now, these
offences, in England, are cognisable in the ecclesiastical courts:
Co. B Inst. 205. Or, at least, were so until the comparatively-
recent constitution of the court for "Divorce and Matrimonial
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Causes:" 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85.' In this country such offences
have frequently been held indictable at common law, as will be
seen hereafter. See post, Part III., §§ 19, 20.
24. Malicious mischief, too, has received a far more extensive
interpretation here than it has received in England: see post,
Part III., § 25 et seq. There, says Wharton, in his Treatise on
American Criminal Law, § 2002, each object of investment, as
it arose into notice, became the subject of legislative protection ;
'and as far back as the reports go, there has been scarcely a single
article of property which was likely to prove the subject of mis-
chievous injury, which was not sheltered from such assaults by
severe penalties. Thus, for instance, a series of statutes, upwards
of twelve in number, beginning with the 37 Hen. 8, c. 6, and
ending with "The Black Act," were provided f(r the single pur-
pose of preventing wanton mischief to cattle and other beasts of
certain kinds. Upwards of eighteen hundred sections, it is esti-
mated, of acts, running from Hen. 8 to Geo. 3, repealed or other-
wise, were enacted for the especial purpose of providing against
malicious mischief. In this country, in numerous cases where
there were no such statutes, malicious mischief has been made the
subject of adjudication at common law.
25. The comprehensiveness of the common law, however, is
illustrated in England, by a series of cases which show that there
is no public wrong, unprovided for by special statute, which is
not the subject of a criminal action. Thus it has been held
indictable wantonly and injuriously to carry a child infected with
small-pox, along the public streets (The Kfing v. TYantandillo, 4
M. & Sel. 73 ; Zing v. Burnett, Ibid. 272) ; to refuse to provide
necessities for an infant of tender years, whether child, apprentice,
br servaiit (Regina v. Smith, 8 0. & P. 153 ; Regina v. .arriott,
Ibid. 425) ; to show a monster for money (Hferring v. Walround,
2 Ch. Cas. 110) ; to put combustible materials on board a ship
without giving notice of the contents (Williams v. The .East
India Co., 3 East 192) ; and to overwork children in a factory
(Twiss's Life of Lord Eldon 36).
26. Mr. Wharton, in referring to the deficiences for the pro-
tection of the family and social relations, by the most pclished
1 And this act, perhaps, only takes away the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts in strictly matrimonial causes.
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nations of antiquity, says-Even in the most refined classical
eras, no violation of social or domestic duty was held punishable,
unless it fell within the very few overt acts which were prohibited
by statute. Now, observe how different from this it is with the
common law of England and America. With us it is held indict-
able for any one to refuse succor to another to whom he is bound
by social or domestic ties: e. g., parent to child, child to parent,
husband to wife, master to servant; or, even, when, by peculiar
circumstances, the duty of protection is created from one to the
other,-stranger to stranger. Few criminal cases are now more
frequent than those in which the law steps in and enforces these
very duties. The man -who refuses to supply his apprentice with
suitable food; the husband who neglects the proper nurture of his
wife; the stranger who lets a helpless infant starve at his gate,
have each, when injuries have ensued, been held penally liable.
Now, on what principle do these cases rest? Certainly, not on
statute, because there is no statute on the subject. They are
sustained on that broad principle of common law, that, when a
duty is violated, a penalty will be imposed. But what is there
to declare this duty? The only method of solving this difficulty
is by resort to the great substratum of Christian ethics, on which
the common law, as declared judicially by the English courts,
from whence we took it, is founded: Whart. Or. Law, § 2544.
27. The common law is also defined to be the experience of the
past, and the wisdom of the present, age, applied to the exigencies
of the particular case. See Cottrill v. MyTqrick, 8 Fairf. 222.
In this sense it includes not only the decisions of the courts, but
the opinions of experts on the particular branches to which their
attention has been devoted. Thus, the evidence of persons
acquainted with navigation is admissible upon the facts as deve-
loped in cases of collision, or loss from alleged unseaworthiness;
of persons conversant with handwriting, as to whether a paper
was forged ; of seal-engravers, as to the genuineness of an im-
pression; of artists, as to whether a painting is an original or a
copy; of postmasters, as to the genuineness of a postnark ; of
scientific engineers, as to the effect of an embankment on a
harbor; of practical surveyors, as to whether certain marks were
intended as boundaries or terriers; and of naturalists, as to whe-
ther the habits of certain fish were such as to enable them to
overcome certain obstructions in a river. And so, nothing is
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more common than to examine a surgeon as to whether death
resulted from natural causes, or from certain artificial agencies
which may be the subject of inquiry. On this principle the opi-
nion of medical men as to whether particular symptoms, supposing
them to exist, constitute insanity, is part of the law of the case:
Whart. Cr. Law, § 47.
28. As a further illustration of the use that is made. of the
common law, the following is selected :-Mfurder, defined at com-
mon law, is where a man of sound memory, and of the age of dis-
cretion, unlawfully killeth within any county of the realm, any
reasonable creature in rerum na tura, under the king's peace,
with malice forethought, either expressed by the party, or implied
by law, so as the party wounded, or hurt, &c., die of the wound,
or hurt, &c., within a year and a day after the- same: Bracton,
1. 3, fo. 20 et seq.; Britten, fo. 5, 18; Fleta, 1. 1, c. 23 and 30.
29. Every word of any importance in the above definition, has
been made'the subject of judicial decisions in various ages, and
the meaning and force of each of them, with the various conse-
quences arising directly out of, or collateral to them, have been,
by those adjudications, absolutely fixed and determined. These,
and similar adjudications relating to crimes, comprise some of the
most important features of the common law. Thus, in the defini-
tion selected, as to what is sound memory; what the age of dis-
cretion ; what unlawfully killing; what a reasonable creature in
rerum nat'ura ; what under the king's peace; and what express
and implied malice, have all been judicially declared. So have
the various questions connected with killing within any county
of the realm; how the year and a day are to be accounted; who
are principals and who accessories ; whether the offence is murder,
or manslaughter, or justifiable homicide, and numerous other in-
cidental questions that have been brought practically before the
courts during the thousand years that the principles of the
common law have been in force in the nation from which we
derived it.
30. As much space as could be spared has now been devoted
to a consideration of the origin, early history, and general prin-
ciples of the common law. Further consideration will be given
to these last, in detail, in subsequent parts of this article. The
following brief extracts are given from a learned defender of the
